I have been through the references. I agree with what you write but it would be helpful (for my work) if you knew if there was a specific reference where Augustine refutes Hermes? Is it possible to pin-point one or two sentences? This is an helpful article. Thank you.
Greetings, Mr. Carroll. Thanks for reading -- and for your question.
There are a few complications or hurdles. Let me run thru them, just for completeness.
The first is that, "refutation" (strictly so-called) is the sort of conclusive demonstration of falsity that is, by my lights, only attainable in logic or in mathematics. In this way, refutation is the other side of the coin for a formal "proof." Of course, in a proof, one reasons -- through a series of well-defined steps (via a process of "derivation" or "solution") -- from a set of foundational statements ("axioms") to various conclusions (or "theorems"). And when this framework is observed, the conclusions reached can be established with "certainty."
But it's worth pausing to note two important reasons for the certainty, here. Number one, in contexts like classical logic and math (say, Euclidean geometry), the axioms are just "given" -- that is, they're accepted to be true. Number two, the reasoning steps -- specified in various formulae, law, principles, or transformation rules -- are also given. (I am aware of various non-classical logics -- such as "fuzzy" logic, intutional logic, multi-valent logic, etc. -- as well as non-Euclidean geometries -- based on Gaussian, Lobachevskian, or Riemannian assumptions, etc. But since the existence of these alternative approaches tends to be leveraged into an assertion to the effect that proof and refutation are unavailable even in logic and math, I will set all this aside.)
Some people think that the "hard-science" disciplines of chemistry or physics come close to this logical-mathematical "ideal." But, most other areas of human endeavor (like art or politics) or human inquiry (such as biology, economics, history, sociology, etc.) are evidently pretty far from it.
Classical logic and Euclidean geometry (and allied systems) are somewhat like the game of chess. We don't have to play chess. But if we're going to play, then: we have to use the sixteen pieces that we're given; we have to place them correctly on the 64-square board; we have to move them according to prescribed rules; etc. If we observe all the niceties -- that is, if we play the game correctly -- then we can often name a clear winner in a head-to-head contest.
So, the second hurdle is that, on one way of looking at things, Hermes and Augustine are playing two different "games" (metaphorically). This is to say -- at least -- that they reach different conclusions because they begin with different premises. What they are interested in, and are writing about, is (if we have to label it) something like "metaphysics" or theology. And in these areas, there is no one set of axioms that is agreed upon by all "players."
I recently wrote about psychology. And, historically anyway, there is a dizzying variety of different "schools," from behaviorism, cognitivism, and depth psychology on the one hand to functionalism, structuralism, and humanistic or transpersonal psychology on the other (and other avenues besides). Once you have settled on an approach (whether consciously or otherwise) then you can begin to advise, analyze, and publish to your heart's content. But sometimes t's not at all obvious (to me) that Adler, Freud, Jung, Skinner, et al. are even talking about the same things.
In cases where we're trying to decide between, or make "value judgments" about, competing systems, what we're mainly concerned with are things like: examining (confirming or disconfirming) evidence and then using the evidence to either attack a system or defend it -- as well as to defend against opponents' attacks. In these projects, rather than "disproving," "proving" "refuting," etc. we'll be talking more about "challenging," "corroborating," "rebutting," and the like of those.
To be clear, I'm not saying that Augustine and Hermes are altogether like two ships passing in the night. The two of them even share some beliefs in common (for instance, a commitment to the existence of human souls and to their immortality). But, there is divergence. And their differences of approach and assumptions are complicated by the fact that their presentational styles differ as well.
For example, Augustine's 'City of God' is much more in the idiom of (what we think of as conventional) philosophical argument than is the 'Corpus Hermeticum.' Even Augustine's autobiographical 'Confessions' is something of a mixture of argument and narrative. True, the Plato's 'Dialogues' have more than a little narrative flourish also. So, the point isn't that Augustine and Hermes are utterly incommensurable. But I do think that if we want to compare and contrast arguments from Augustine and Hermes, we will first have to extract the premises from the latter's narratives by (some method of) "literary interpretation" and then we'll have to construct a formal-type argument ourselves.
Okay, but once we clear these two hurdles, can we fill your order?
We may think of the hermetic literature, in general terms, as a set of claims about (or based on) the belief that human beings in some way share in the divinity of the "Absolute" or the "One" or whatever you want to call it, as we may see in passages such as the following, in the "Poimander."
"But All-Father Mind, being Life and Light, did bring forth Man co-equal to Himself...". (Poemandres, the Shepherd of Men, par. 12, G. R. S. Mead, transl., <http://www.gnosis.org/library/hermes1.html>.)
This "co-equal" status seems to be grounded in the "facts" (according to hermeticists, anyway) that: (1) all things are interconnected, an idea illustrated in the maxim "as above, so below" (meaning, something like that our "level" of reality, called the "microcosm," somehow partakes in and reflects "higher levels" of reality, the "macrocosm"); and (2) that the world -- including human souls -- is an "emanation" out of the "One."
Thus, in the "Emerald Tablet," we read:
"That which is below is like that which is above and that which is above is like that which is below to do the miracle of one only thing. ...[A]ll things have been and arose from one by the mediation of one: so all things have their birth from this one thing by adaptation." (Tabula Smaragdina, Isaac Newton, transl., Keynes MS. 28, King's College Library, Cambridge Univ.; online at <https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/newton/mss/norm/ALCH00017>.)
On the other hand, Augustine is understood as articulating a doctrine now known as "creatio ex nihilo." According to this, (1) God (as "creator") is radically distinct from the world (his "creation"), so much so that God created the world "out of nothing"; and (2) God and the world -- including human souls -- are "in no wise ...equal," as Augustine counter-asserts in "Confessions":
"You, ...Lord God Almighty, did in the beginning, ...create ...out of nothing. ...Thou created heaven and earth, not out of Yourself, for then they would be equal to ...to You; and in no wise would it be right that anything should be equal to You which was not of You." (Augustine, 'The Confessions,' book XII, J. G. Pilkington, transl.; in Philip Schaff, ed., Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, vol. 1, Buffalo, N.Y.: Christian Literature Publ. Co., 1887; revised and archived online by Kevin Knight, ed., New Advent, <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/110112.htm>.)
Usually, the name "Hermes Trismegistus" -- which latter word translates to "Three-Times Great" or "Thrice-Greatest" -- is said (e.g., in the "Emerald Tablet," loc. cit.) to summarize the claim that Hermes / Mercury / Thoth "has" (or has mastered) "the three parts of the philosophy of the whole world."
Presumably, these "three parts of the philosophy" are the means by which humans may achieve (something like) "spiritual ascent" and "go back to" or "reunite with" the "One." But let's just say that this goal (reunion with the One) and the means to achieve it (three parts of the philosophy) are morally good.
The "three parts" are enumerated differently depending on the work you consult. Ways that I've seen include: alchemy, astrology, and magic; alchemy, philosophy, and theurgy; alchemy, Kabbalah, and metaphysics; or some combination, etc.
But if -- for example -- we just think about magic or theurgy, then we can translate the Hermetic claim into a proposition such as the following.
Humans ought to use magical invocations or rituals to achieve divine transformation, attain spiritual enlightenment, or otherwise reunite with the "One."
However, in a fairly straightforward sense, Augustine can be understood as taking an opposite line and critiques (or condemns) Hermes's endorsement of theurgy. Augustine argues, instead, that such techniques are actually interactions with demons -- and are forbidden by the Bible. So, for instance, in 'The City of God,' we read:
Hermeticists "wish to discriminate between those ...call[ed] magicians, who practise necromancy, and are addicted to illicit arts and condemned, and those others ...worthy of praise for their practice of theurgy — the truth, however, being that both classes are the slaves of the deceitful rites of the demons whom they invoke under the names of angels." (Augustine, 'The City of God,' book X; Marcus Dods, transl., in Philip Schaff, ed., Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, vol. 2, Buffalo, N.Y.: Christian Literature Publ. Co., 1887; revised and archived online by Kevin Knight, New Advent, <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/120110.htm>.)
(By the way, for the connexion between Neoplatonism and Hermeticism -- especially how Iamblichan Neoplatonism is justified by appealing to the 'Corpus Hermeticum,' see Garth Fowden, The Egyptian Hermes, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986, passim., but e.g., pp. 99ff.)
If you want to proceed further, you can look at the 'Asclepius' where the point and rationale for Hermetic theurgy is further explained. I'm thinking, for example, of the section titled "In Praise of Man" (which could probably have been written by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola or Karol Wojtyla).
"...The first God is the Lord of Eternity, the second is the cosmos, and the third is Man. ...Man ...is a jewel to the cosmos, as is the cosmos to him. Because of his divine composition, ...Man knows himself and he knows the cosmos... While giving the greatest praises and thanks to God and reverencing his image, he is yet aware that he himself is the second image of God; for there are two images of God: the cosmos and Man. Hence it comes about that Man is a union of different parts. In part he is composed from soul and consciousness, spirit and reason by which he is divine. By these superior elements he seems able to ascend to heaven, but by the worldly part which consists of fire, earth, water and air he remains mortal upon earth lest he leave bereft and wasted all those things committed to his care. Thus mankind has been created in part divine and in part mortal, consisting of body." (Asclepius: The Perfect Discourse of Hermes Trismegistus, Clement Salaman, ed. and transl., London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2013, pp. 63-64.)
These notions were taken -- by people like G. R. S. Mead -- as follows. "The secret of ...divine operation (or theurgy) is based upon the fact that the soul can be transformed into every likeness. The Great Likeness of God is the Cosmic Order, the making oneself into this Likeness is the supreme transformation or transfiguration of the soul." (Mead, Thrice-Greatest Hermes, vol. 2; <http://gnosis.org/library/grs-mead/TGH-v2/th222.html>.) -- And Hermeticists seem to hold that such a transformation is possible.
Whereas, again, to Augustine, the Creator-creature gap cannot be bridged, ontologically. At best, according to some Eastern Orthodox theologians (among others), in a process somewhat confusingly called "deification" or "theosis," men can be made more godlike by spiritual growth. As Augustine puts it: "men" are sometimes called "gods" (e.g., in Psalm 50) when they "are deified... [by God's] Grace," but they are "not born of His Substance." (Augustine, 'Exposition on Psalm 50'; J. E. Tweed, transl., Philip Schaff, ed., Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, vol. 8, Buffalo, N.Y.: Christian Literature Publ. Co., 1888; archived online Kevin Knight, New Advent, <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1801050.htm>.)
Okay, sorry. That was longer than I had intended it to be. I hope it's (at least marginally) helpful. Cheers! -- Matt
I have been through the references. I agree with what you write but it would be helpful (for my work) if you knew if there was a specific reference where Augustine refutes Hermes? Is it possible to pin-point one or two sentences? This is an helpful article. Thank you.
Greetings, Mr. Carroll. Thanks for reading -- and for your question.
There are a few complications or hurdles. Let me run thru them, just for completeness.
The first is that, "refutation" (strictly so-called) is the sort of conclusive demonstration of falsity that is, by my lights, only attainable in logic or in mathematics. In this way, refutation is the other side of the coin for a formal "proof." Of course, in a proof, one reasons -- through a series of well-defined steps (via a process of "derivation" or "solution") -- from a set of foundational statements ("axioms") to various conclusions (or "theorems"). And when this framework is observed, the conclusions reached can be established with "certainty."
But it's worth pausing to note two important reasons for the certainty, here. Number one, in contexts like classical logic and math (say, Euclidean geometry), the axioms are just "given" -- that is, they're accepted to be true. Number two, the reasoning steps -- specified in various formulae, law, principles, or transformation rules -- are also given. (I am aware of various non-classical logics -- such as "fuzzy" logic, intutional logic, multi-valent logic, etc. -- as well as non-Euclidean geometries -- based on Gaussian, Lobachevskian, or Riemannian assumptions, etc. But since the existence of these alternative approaches tends to be leveraged into an assertion to the effect that proof and refutation are unavailable even in logic and math, I will set all this aside.)
Some people think that the "hard-science" disciplines of chemistry or physics come close to this logical-mathematical "ideal." But, most other areas of human endeavor (like art or politics) or human inquiry (such as biology, economics, history, sociology, etc.) are evidently pretty far from it.
Classical logic and Euclidean geometry (and allied systems) are somewhat like the game of chess. We don't have to play chess. But if we're going to play, then: we have to use the sixteen pieces that we're given; we have to place them correctly on the 64-square board; we have to move them according to prescribed rules; etc. If we observe all the niceties -- that is, if we play the game correctly -- then we can often name a clear winner in a head-to-head contest.
So, the second hurdle is that, on one way of looking at things, Hermes and Augustine are playing two different "games" (metaphorically). This is to say -- at least -- that they reach different conclusions because they begin with different premises. What they are interested in, and are writing about, is (if we have to label it) something like "metaphysics" or theology. And in these areas, there is no one set of axioms that is agreed upon by all "players."
I recently wrote about psychology. And, historically anyway, there is a dizzying variety of different "schools," from behaviorism, cognitivism, and depth psychology on the one hand to functionalism, structuralism, and humanistic or transpersonal psychology on the other (and other avenues besides). Once you have settled on an approach (whether consciously or otherwise) then you can begin to advise, analyze, and publish to your heart's content. But sometimes t's not at all obvious (to me) that Adler, Freud, Jung, Skinner, et al. are even talking about the same things.
In cases where we're trying to decide between, or make "value judgments" about, competing systems, what we're mainly concerned with are things like: examining (confirming or disconfirming) evidence and then using the evidence to either attack a system or defend it -- as well as to defend against opponents' attacks. In these projects, rather than "disproving," "proving" "refuting," etc. we'll be talking more about "challenging," "corroborating," "rebutting," and the like of those.
To be clear, I'm not saying that Augustine and Hermes are altogether like two ships passing in the night. The two of them even share some beliefs in common (for instance, a commitment to the existence of human souls and to their immortality). But, there is divergence. And their differences of approach and assumptions are complicated by the fact that their presentational styles differ as well.
For example, Augustine's 'City of God' is much more in the idiom of (what we think of as conventional) philosophical argument than is the 'Corpus Hermeticum.' Even Augustine's autobiographical 'Confessions' is something of a mixture of argument and narrative. True, the Plato's 'Dialogues' have more than a little narrative flourish also. So, the point isn't that Augustine and Hermes are utterly incommensurable. But I do think that if we want to compare and contrast arguments from Augustine and Hermes, we will first have to extract the premises from the latter's narratives by (some method of) "literary interpretation" and then we'll have to construct a formal-type argument ourselves.
Okay, but once we clear these two hurdles, can we fill your order?
We may think of the hermetic literature, in general terms, as a set of claims about (or based on) the belief that human beings in some way share in the divinity of the "Absolute" or the "One" or whatever you want to call it, as we may see in passages such as the following, in the "Poimander."
"But All-Father Mind, being Life and Light, did bring forth Man co-equal to Himself...". (Poemandres, the Shepherd of Men, par. 12, G. R. S. Mead, transl., <http://www.gnosis.org/library/hermes1.html>.)
This "co-equal" status seems to be grounded in the "facts" (according to hermeticists, anyway) that: (1) all things are interconnected, an idea illustrated in the maxim "as above, so below" (meaning, something like that our "level" of reality, called the "microcosm," somehow partakes in and reflects "higher levels" of reality, the "macrocosm"); and (2) that the world -- including human souls -- is an "emanation" out of the "One."
Thus, in the "Emerald Tablet," we read:
"That which is below is like that which is above and that which is above is like that which is below to do the miracle of one only thing. ...[A]ll things have been and arose from one by the mediation of one: so all things have their birth from this one thing by adaptation." (Tabula Smaragdina, Isaac Newton, transl., Keynes MS. 28, King's College Library, Cambridge Univ.; online at <https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/newton/mss/norm/ALCH00017>.)
On the other hand, Augustine is understood as articulating a doctrine now known as "creatio ex nihilo." According to this, (1) God (as "creator") is radically distinct from the world (his "creation"), so much so that God created the world "out of nothing"; and (2) God and the world -- including human souls -- are "in no wise ...equal," as Augustine counter-asserts in "Confessions":
"You, ...Lord God Almighty, did in the beginning, ...create ...out of nothing. ...Thou created heaven and earth, not out of Yourself, for then they would be equal to ...to You; and in no wise would it be right that anything should be equal to You which was not of You." (Augustine, 'The Confessions,' book XII, J. G. Pilkington, transl.; in Philip Schaff, ed., Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, vol. 1, Buffalo, N.Y.: Christian Literature Publ. Co., 1887; revised and archived online by Kevin Knight, ed., New Advent, <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/110112.htm>.)
Usually, the name "Hermes Trismegistus" -- which latter word translates to "Three-Times Great" or "Thrice-Greatest" -- is said (e.g., in the "Emerald Tablet," loc. cit.) to summarize the claim that Hermes / Mercury / Thoth "has" (or has mastered) "the three parts of the philosophy of the whole world."
Presumably, these "three parts of the philosophy" are the means by which humans may achieve (something like) "spiritual ascent" and "go back to" or "reunite with" the "One." But let's just say that this goal (reunion with the One) and the means to achieve it (three parts of the philosophy) are morally good.
The "three parts" are enumerated differently depending on the work you consult. Ways that I've seen include: alchemy, astrology, and magic; alchemy, philosophy, and theurgy; alchemy, Kabbalah, and metaphysics; or some combination, etc.
But if -- for example -- we just think about magic or theurgy, then we can translate the Hermetic claim into a proposition such as the following.
Humans ought to use magical invocations or rituals to achieve divine transformation, attain spiritual enlightenment, or otherwise reunite with the "One."
However, in a fairly straightforward sense, Augustine can be understood as taking an opposite line and critiques (or condemns) Hermes's endorsement of theurgy. Augustine argues, instead, that such techniques are actually interactions with demons -- and are forbidden by the Bible. So, for instance, in 'The City of God,' we read:
Hermeticists "wish to discriminate between those ...call[ed] magicians, who practise necromancy, and are addicted to illicit arts and condemned, and those others ...worthy of praise for their practice of theurgy — the truth, however, being that both classes are the slaves of the deceitful rites of the demons whom they invoke under the names of angels." (Augustine, 'The City of God,' book X; Marcus Dods, transl., in Philip Schaff, ed., Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, vol. 2, Buffalo, N.Y.: Christian Literature Publ. Co., 1887; revised and archived online by Kevin Knight, New Advent, <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/120110.htm>.)
(By the way, for the connexion between Neoplatonism and Hermeticism -- especially how Iamblichan Neoplatonism is justified by appealing to the 'Corpus Hermeticum,' see Garth Fowden, The Egyptian Hermes, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986, passim., but e.g., pp. 99ff.)
If you want to proceed further, you can look at the 'Asclepius' where the point and rationale for Hermetic theurgy is further explained. I'm thinking, for example, of the section titled "In Praise of Man" (which could probably have been written by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola or Karol Wojtyla).
"...The first God is the Lord of Eternity, the second is the cosmos, and the third is Man. ...Man ...is a jewel to the cosmos, as is the cosmos to him. Because of his divine composition, ...Man knows himself and he knows the cosmos... While giving the greatest praises and thanks to God and reverencing his image, he is yet aware that he himself is the second image of God; for there are two images of God: the cosmos and Man. Hence it comes about that Man is a union of different parts. In part he is composed from soul and consciousness, spirit and reason by which he is divine. By these superior elements he seems able to ascend to heaven, but by the worldly part which consists of fire, earth, water and air he remains mortal upon earth lest he leave bereft and wasted all those things committed to his care. Thus mankind has been created in part divine and in part mortal, consisting of body." (Asclepius: The Perfect Discourse of Hermes Trismegistus, Clement Salaman, ed. and transl., London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2013, pp. 63-64.)
These notions were taken -- by people like G. R. S. Mead -- as follows. "The secret of ...divine operation (or theurgy) is based upon the fact that the soul can be transformed into every likeness. The Great Likeness of God is the Cosmic Order, the making oneself into this Likeness is the supreme transformation or transfiguration of the soul." (Mead, Thrice-Greatest Hermes, vol. 2; <http://gnosis.org/library/grs-mead/TGH-v2/th222.html>.) -- And Hermeticists seem to hold that such a transformation is possible.
Whereas, again, to Augustine, the Creator-creature gap cannot be bridged, ontologically. At best, according to some Eastern Orthodox theologians (among others), in a process somewhat confusingly called "deification" or "theosis," men can be made more godlike by spiritual growth. As Augustine puts it: "men" are sometimes called "gods" (e.g., in Psalm 50) when they "are deified... [by God's] Grace," but they are "not born of His Substance." (Augustine, 'Exposition on Psalm 50'; J. E. Tweed, transl., Philip Schaff, ed., Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, vol. 8, Buffalo, N.Y.: Christian Literature Publ. Co., 1888; archived online Kevin Knight, New Advent, <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1801050.htm>.)
Okay, sorry. That was longer than I had intended it to be. I hope it's (at least marginally) helpful. Cheers! -- Matt